We study situations where a new entrant with privately known talent competes with an incumbent whose talent is common knowledge. Competition takes the form of a rank-order tournament. Prior to the competition, the newbie can "show off," i.e., send a talent revealing costly signal. We find that...

We report on experiments examining the value of commitment in Stackelberg games where the follower chooses whether to pay some cost to perfectly observe the leader's action. Várdy (2004) shows that in the unique pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, the value of commitment is...

Organizational theory suggests that authority should lie in the hands of those with information, yet the power to transfer authority is rarely absolute in practice. We investigate the validity and application of this advice in a model of optimal contracting between an uninformed principal and...

We study the value of commitment in contests and tournaments when there are costs for the follower to observe the leader's behavior. In a contest, the follower can pay to observe the leader's effort but cannot observe the effectiveness of that effort. In a tournament, the follower can pay to...

Timing is crucial in situations ranging from currency attacks, to product introductions, to starting a revolution. These settings share the feature that payoffs depend critically on the timing of a few other key players - and their moves are uncertain. To capture this, we introduce the notion of...

We examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information (controlled by a gatekeeper) and the homogenous product market it serves. The gatekeeper charges fees to firms that advertise prices on its Internet site and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices....

Clearinghouse models of online pricing - such as Varian (1980), Rosenthal (1980), Narasimhan (1988), and Baye-Morgan (2001) - view a price comparison site as an "information clearing-house" where shoppers and loyals obtain price and product information to make online purchases. These models...

A standard "solution" offered to the deleterious effects of all-out price competition is for firms to engage in differentiation strategies. This solution, however, depends critically on the inability of rivals to imitate a successful differentiation strategy. With imitation, we show how "Red...

We model a homogeneous product environment where identical e-retailers endogenously engage in both brand advertising (to create loyal customers)and price advertising (to attract shoppers). Our analysis allows for cross-channel effects; indeed, we show that price advertising is a substitute for...