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Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey
Biró, Péter; Klijn, Flip - 2011
This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with … recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with … couples. We discuss contributions from computer scientists, economists, and game theorists. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494484
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Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
Ashlagi, Itai; Braverman, Mark; Hassidim, Avinatan - In: Operations research 62 (2014) 4, pp. 713-732
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403174
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Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005
We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851319
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MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY
BIRÓ, PÉTER; KLIJN, FLIP - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 15 (2013) 02, pp. 1340008-1
This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with … recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with … couples. We discuss contributions from computer scientists, economists, and game theorists. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011011309
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Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey
Biro, Peter; Klijn, Flip - Közgazdaság-tudományi Intézet, Közgazdaság- és … - 2011
This survey deals with two-sided matching markets where one set of agents (workers/residents) has to be matched with … recent contributions to a complex and representative case of matching with complementarities, namely matching markets with … couples. We discuss contributions from computer scientists, economists, and game theorists. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009366301
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Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2007
We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572183
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Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2005
We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572229
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Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004
We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain …. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that … yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582635
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Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2002
It is well-known that couples that look jointly for jobs in the same centralized labor market may cause instabilities …. We demonstrate that for a natural preference domain for couples, namely the domain of responsive preferences, the … the nonexistence of stable matchings in couples markets is not a singular theoretical irregularity. Our nonexistence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168440
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Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples
Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004
) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion …Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain …, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547122