We propose a portfolio selection model based on a class of monotone preferences that coincide with mean-variance preferences on their domain of monotonicity, but differ where mean-variance preferences fail to be monotone and are therefore not economically meaningful. The functional associated to...

We introduce and axiomatize dynamic variational preferences, the dynamic version of the variational preferences we axiomatized in [21], which generalize the multiple priors preferences of Gilboa and Schmeidler [9], and include the Multiplier Preferences inspired by robust control and first used...

We report a surprising link between optimal portfolios generated by a special type of variational preferences called divergence preferences (cf. [8]) and optimal portfolios generated by classical expected utility. As a special case we connect optimization of truncated quadratic utility (cf. [2])...

When there is uncertainty about interest rates (typically due to either illiquidity or defaultability of zero coupon bonds) the cash- additivity assumption on risk measures becomes problematic. When this assumption is weakened, to cash-subadditivity for example, the equivalence between convexity...

We introduce a notion of complete monotone quasiconcave duality and we show that it holds for important classes of quasiconcave functions.

We study uncertainty averse preferences, that is, complete and transitive preferences that are convex and monotone. We establish a representation result, which is at same time general and rich in structure. Many objective functions commonly used in applications are special cases of this...

A decision maker is characterized by two binary relations. The first reflects decisions that are rational in an “objective” sense: the decision maker can convince others that she is right in making them. The second relation models decisions that are rational in a “subjective” sense: the...

We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility co- operative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz...

We study the updating of beliefs under ambiguity for invariant biseparable preferences. In particular, we show that a natural form of dynamic consistency characterizes the Bayesian updating of these beliefs.