In this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality of goods is a seller’s private information while the realized distribution of qualities is public information. We show that in equilibrium all goods can be traded if the size of the supply...

In this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality of goods is a seller’s private information while the realized distribution of qualities is public information. We show that in equilibrium all goods can be traded if the size of the supply...

We develop a model of persuasion where, consistent with the psychological literature on dual process theory, the persuadee has to sustain a cognitive effort - the elaboration cost - in order to fully and precisely elaborate information. The persuader makes an offer to the persuadee and, aware...

In this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality of goods is a seller’s private information while the realized distribution of qualities is public information. We show that in equilibrium all goods can be traded if the size of the supply...

In this paper we study the typical dilemma of social coordination between a risk- dominant convention and a payoff-dominant convention. In particular, we consider a model where a population of agents play a coordination game over time, choosing both the action and the network of agents with whom...

We demonstrate that in models where agents have concerns for status the model predictions can drastically change depending on whether status is modelled as an ordinal or cardinal magnitude. As a proof, we show that two well known theoretical findings are not robust to the substitution of ordinal...

We study the impact of redistributive policies when agents can signal their social status by spending on a conspicuous good. Our focus is on how the shape of the status function – i.e., how social status is computed and evaluated – can affect the equilibrium outcome of the model, and in...

We present a model of two-sided matching where utility is non-transferable and information about individuals’skills is private, utilities are strictly increasing in the partner’s skill and satisfy increasing differences. Skills can be either revealed or kept hidden, but while agents on one...