We study the evolution of conventions in a coordination game where: (i) agents choose a location to interact locally, (ii) interactions are sometimes global and sometimes local, and (iii) agents can be either fine or coarse reasoners, i.e., agents are able or not, respectively, to distinguish...

This paper investigates the emergence of cooperation in a heterogeneous population. The population is divided into two cultural groups. Agents in the population are randomly matched in pairs to engage in a prisoner dilemma. The matching process is assortative, that is, cooperators are more...

We study the long-run evolutionary outcome emerging when two populations of agents play the demand game with three (or a few) possible splits, with the two populations differing in the sample sizes used when best responding to retrieved information from the past. We focus on the relation between...

We take an evolutionary perspective to explore the implications of different relationships between power and initiation of conflicts (i.e., conflict initiation function) for the long-run distribution of power between groups. So far, attention has focused on how the role played by the...