We study the long-run evolutionary outcome emerging when two populations of agents play the demand game with three (or a few) possible splits, with the two populations differing in the sample sizes used when best responding to retrieved information from the past. We focus on the relation between...

We take an evolutionary perspective to explore the implications of different relationships between power and initiation of conflicts (i.e., conflict initiation function) for the long-run distribution of power between groups. So far, attention has focused on how the role played by the...

We study the role of uncertainty in the evolution of conventions in coordination games when agents are myopic best responders. We introduce uncertainty of the choice environment by means of an ergodic Markov process ruling the switching across a collection of 2-player symmetric coordination...

We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for goods to be normal when utility functions are differentiable and strongly quasi-concave. Our condition is equivalent to the condition proposed by Alarie et al. (1990), but it is easier to check: it only requires to compute the minors associated...

In this paper we study how the presence of a small amount of noise in signaling games impacts on the likelihood of separation and, hence, the likelihood of information transmission. We consider a variant of a standard signaling model where a source of exogenous noise affects the signals that...

In this paper we identify a novel reason why signaling may fail to separate types, which is specific to cases where the receiver has to incur a cost to acquire the signal sent by the sender. If the receiver chooses not to incur the acquisition cost, then all sender's types find it optimal to...

We develop a model of persuasion where, consistent with the psychological literature on dual process theory, the persuadee has to sustain a cognitive effort - the elaboration cost - in order to fully and precisely elaborate information. The persuader makes an offer to the persuadee and, aware...