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An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis
Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Strassmair, Christina - 2008
the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability … of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across … to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives backfire. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003951485
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An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis
Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah; Strassmair, Christina - 2008
the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability … of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across … to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives backfire. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365846
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An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis
Hörisch, Hannah; Strassmair, Christina - 2008
the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability … of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across … to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives backfire. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333954
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An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis
Hörisch, Hannah; Strassmair, Christina - 2008
the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability … of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across … to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives backfire. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427518
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An experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis
Hörisch, Hannah; Strassmair, Christina - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
the deterrence hypothesis, namely that crime is weakly decreasing in deterrent incentives, i.e. severity and probability … of punishment. In our experiment, subjects can steal from another participant's payoff. Deterrent incentives vary across … to the deterrence hypothesis and fair-minded subjects for whom deterrent incentives backfire. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785872
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Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? : an experiment
Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah - 2008
We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343920
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Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment
Hörisch, Hannah - 2008
We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334049
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Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment
Hörisch, Hannah - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our experimental design allows separating the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Subjects prefer more equal distributions behind than in front of the veil of ignorance, but only a minority acts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785895
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Deterrence by imperfect sanctions: A public good experiment
Engel, Christoph - 2013
Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I show that they may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using the Fehr/Schmidt model (QJE 1999) I define three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323867
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Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions – A Public Good Experiment
Engel, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2013
Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I show that they may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using the Fehr/Schmidt model (QJE 1999) I define three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010667903