If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities …

If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities …

If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities …

If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities …

If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities …

four prizes of different size and compare it to "parallel" contests with the same prizes, but where participants have to … same prize. Despite the theoretical predictions, the parallel contests lead to higher efforts for all players, but mainly … by lower-ability players. Division of prizes leads to the predicted effects. In parallel contests, too many players …

We study two-player all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We show that the … the prize for winning. The implications of this result are twofold. First, in symmetric one-stage contests, the designer …-third of the prize for winning. Second, in multi-stage contests, the designer should not limit the number of stages (tie …

their efforts. We assume that student preferences are homogeneous over colleges. By modeling college admissions as contests …