According to Becker (1968) it is best to use very high fines and low inspection probabilities to deter traffic accidents because inspection is costly. This paper uses a political economy model to analyse the choice of the fine and the inspection probability. There are two lobby groups: the...

In this paper, we aim to include rule making, implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs into the cost comparison of policy instruments. We use a simple partial equilibrium model and apply it to the textile industry. The model includes discrete abatement functions and costly monitoring and...

Across countries and regions, we observe wide variations in the level of enforcement instruments (fines and inspections) that are used to reach compliance with environmental regulations. In this paper, we study whether the differences in enforcement policies can be justified from an efficiency...

We analyze judicial policy lines concerning criminal environmental sanctioning using a unique European dataset of individual criminal cases, including case-specific information on offenses and offenders. We investigate policy choices made by criminal judges in lower courts as well as the...

This model explicitly incorporates the dynamic aspects of conservation programs with incomplete compliance and it allows landholders’ behavior to change over time. A distinction is made between initial and continuing compliance. We find that incomplete and instrument-specific enforcement can...