Self regulation encouraged by market discipline constitutes a key component of Basel II's third pillar. But high-risk investment strategies may maximize the expected value of some banks. In these cases, does market discipline encourage risk-taking that undermines bank stability in economic...

Earlier studies found little evidence of scale economies at large banks; later studies using data from the 1990s uncovered such evidence, providing a rationale for very large banks seen worldwide. Using more recent data, we estimate scale economies using two production models. The standard...

The unique capital structure of commercial banking – funding production with demandable debt that participates in the economy's payments system – affects various aspects of banking. It shapes commercial banks' comparative advantage in providing financial products and services to...

The Great Recession focused attention on large financial institutions and systemic risk. We investigate whether large size provides any cost advantages to the economy and, if so, whether these cost advantages are due to technological scale economies or too-big-to-fail subsidies. Estimating scale...

SIPERSEDED BY WP 18-11 We investigate the relative performance of publicly traded community banks (those with assets less than $10 billion) versus larger banks (those with assets between $10 billion and $50 billion). A body of research has shown that community banks have potential advantages in...

Our research as well as that by other authors has found scale economies at all sizes of banks and the largest scale economies at the largest banks – that is, larger banks are able to provide products at lower average cost than smaller banks. While the earlier literature found that scale...

The unique capital structure of commercial banking – funding production with demandable debt that participates in the economy's payments system – affects various aspects of banking. It shapes banks' comparative advantage in providing financial products and services to informationally opaque...

We present evidence on the objective function of bank management--that is, are they risk neutral and maximize expected profits, or are they risk averse and trade off profit for risk reduction? We extend the model of Hughes and Mester (1993) to allow a bank's choice of its financial capital level...