We test the hypothesis that corporate managers leave their jobs less often when they receive stock-based compensation. In a sample of CEOs from 452 large U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991, we find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the amount of stock option...

In this empirical study, we examine the effect of CEO stock ownership on leasing. Although financial contracting theory suggests that ownership structure is potentially an important determinant of debt financing and leasing, its effect on leasing has not been previously explored. We also control...

We test the hypothesis that corporate managers leave their jobs less often when they receive stock-based compensation. In a sample of CEOs from 452 U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991, we find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the amount of stock option...

An examination of CEO compensation and turnover in 452 large U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991 provides evidence that compensation policies play a significant role in retaining the services of top managers. We find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the amount by...

In this empirical study, we examine the effect of CEO stock ownership on leasing. Although financial contracting theory suggests that ownership structure is potentially an important determinant of debt financing and leasing, its effect on leasing has not been previously explored. We also control...

We study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms' capital structures, with results generally suggesting that entrenched CEOs seek to avoid debt. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that leverage levels are lower when CEOs do not face pressure from either ownership and...

We study whether CEO involvement in the selection of new directors influences the nature of appointments to the board. When the CEO serves on the nominating committee or no nominating committee exists, firms appoint fewer independent outside directors and more gray outsiders with conflicts of...

This paper analyzes company disclosures of CEO stock option values in compliance with the SEC's regulations for reporting executive compensation data to stockholders. Companies appear to exploit the flexibility of the regulations to reduce the apparent value of managerial compensation. Companies...

We investigate a puzzling empirical regularity: the near-total absence of restrictive covenants from convertible bonds issued by U.S. companies. In a study of 192 recent debt issues, we find that an issuer's investment opportunities are negatively related to the presence of covenants and...