In this paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the chief executive in the formulation of corporate strategy. Unlike traditional applications of agency theory, we allow the agent (CEO) to play a role in defining the parameters of the agency problem. We argue that CEOs will have an...

Lower underpricing amongst venture-backed IPOs has been attributed to a certification role for venture capitalists. We argue that differences in underpricing per se are uninformative and possibly misleading when not controlling for differences in entrepreneurs’ incentives to control...

This paper analyzes yield spreads on sovereign debt issued by emerging markets using modern data from the 1990s and newly-collected historical data on debt traded in London during 1870–1913, a previous “golden era†for international capital market integration. Applying several...

We study how deregulation of corporate law affects the decision of entrepreneurs of where to incorporate. Recent rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have enabled entrepreneurs to select their country of incorporation independently of their real seat. We analyze foreign incorporations...

Deposit insurance schemes are becoming increasingly popular around the world and yet there is little understanding of how they should be designed and what their consequences are. In this paper we provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. We analyse a model in which agents...

Why are there such pronounced differences in patterns of ownership and control of corporations across countries? This paper proposes that these, together with many of the stylized facts of corporate finance, can be explained by private benefits. Private benefits create waste and inefficiency but...

In this paper we show how to calculate European-style option prices when the log-stock and stock returns processes follow a symmetric Levy-Stable process. We extend our results to price European-style options when the log-stock process follows a skewed Levy-Stable process.

We consider an economy in which banks increase social welfare by monitoring but where the verifiable part of banking income is stochastic. Banks abstract non-verifiable returns and this can render banking contracts unattractive to investors. The survival of the banking sector is ensured by a...

It is often taken as axiomatic that investors prefer high levels of regulation. Yet companies have increasingly chosen to list on stock exchanges with lower regulatory requirements. In this paper we analyse whether investors value high regulatory standards for quoted companies. We use the...

Economic theory points to five parties disciplining management of poorly performing firms: holders of large share blocks, acquirers of new blocks, bidders in takeovers, non-executive directors, and investors during periods of financial distress. This paper reports the first comparative...