In this paper we develop an epistemic model for dynamic games in which players may revise their beliefs about the opponents'' preferences (including the opponents'' utility functions) as the game proceeds. Within this framework, we propose a rationalizability concept that is based upon the...

Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents'' rationality (BOR), stating that a player should believe that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player...

In this paper we study three different types of loss aversion equilibria in bimatrix games. Loss aversion equilibria are Nash equilibria of games where players are loss averse and where the reference points – points below which they consider payoffs to be losses – are endogenous to the...

This paper is concerned with a combinatorial, multi-attribute procurement mechanism called combinatorial scoring auction. In the setting that we analyze, private information of the suppliers is multi-dimensional. The buyer wants to procure several items at once. Subsets of these items are...

In this paper we present a model for games with perfect information in which the players, upon observing an unexpected move, may revise their beliefs about the opponents'' preferences over outcomes. For a given profile P of preference relations over outcomes, we impose the following three...

This paper presents a formal epistemic framework for dynamic games in which players, during the course of the game, may revise their beliefs about the opponents'' utility functions. We impose three key conditions upon the players'' beliefs: (a) throughout the game, every move by the opponent...

We consider a game Gn played by two players. There are n independent random variables Z1, ... , Zn, each of which is uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Both players know n, the independence and the distribution of these random variables, but only player 1 knows the vector of realizations...

We consider discounted repeated games in which players can voluntarily purchase information about the opponents' actions at past stages. Information about a stage can be bought at a fixed but arbitrary cost. Opponents cannot observe the information purchase by a player. For our main result, we...