We experimentally investigate the effect of imperfect separation of groups on group selection and cooperation in a standard prisoner¿s dilemma environment. Subjects can repeatedly choose between two groups, where in one of them an institutionalized norm fosters cooperation. The degree of...

We study how players learn to make decisions if they face many different games. Games are drawn randomly from a set of either two or six games in each of 100 rounds. If either there are few games or if extensive summary information is provided (or both) convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium...

Delaying acceptance decisions in the Ultimatum Game drastically increases acceptance of low offers. While in treatments without delay less than 20% of low offers are accepted, 60-80% are accepted as we delay the acceptance decision by around 10 min.

Abstract We experimentally investigate the effect of endogenous matching within a segmented population on peoples' willingness to cooperate as well as their attitudes towards cooperative norms. In the experiment participants can repeatedly choose between two groups, where in one of them a...

We present a model of adaptive economic agents that are k periods forward looking. Agents in our model are randomly matched to interact in finitely repeated games. They form beliefs by relying on their past experience in the same situation (after the same recent history) and then best respond to...

In this paper we provide a framework to reason about limited awareness of the action space in finitely repeated games. Our framework is rich enough to capture the full strategic aspect of limited awareness in a dynamic setting, taking into account the possibility that agents might want to reveal...