The spatial distribution of industries and population is quite lumpy, and this lumpiness varies across industries. Nevertheless, we show using Japanese data for metropolitan areas that the locations of both industries and population are linked by surprisingly simple and persistent patterns. In...

Migrants from rural to urban areas in dvelopong countries are mostly young workers in their teens and twenties. Earlier migration is rational because migration involves investment in human capital. This study particularly addresses learning own ability. When one's own ability is unknown, larger...

We use the duality in linear programming to solva the problem of optimal partnership contracts with moral hazards. We show the importance of allowing the partners to have partial distribution of revenue under some contingencies. An optimal contract maximizes production efficiency minus the loss...

We consider the dynamic trading strategies that minimize the expected cost of trading a large block of securities over a fixed finite number of periods. We obtain the result in which the institutional investor sells more stocks in early stages when we introduce the conjectures about the others'...

Dutta (J. Econom. Theory, 1991, 55, 64?94) showed that long-run optimality of the limit of discounted optima when the discount rate vanishes is implied by a certain bound on the value function of the optimal program. We introduce a new method to verify this bound using coupling techniques.

We consider the dynamic trading strategies that minimize the expected cost of trading a large block of securities over a fixed finite number of periods and the endogenously determined price impact function that yields the execution prices for individual trades. This analysis is novel in that it...

We present a model of incomplete information games with sets of priors. Upon arrival of private information, each player "updates" by the Bayes rule each of priors in this set to construct the set of posteriors consistent with the arrived piece of information. Then the player uses a possibly...

We give an example to show that efficiency in the principal-agent organization depends on the public information nature of the wage contracts. When wage contracts are private, the principal may have a moral hazard problem in deviating from some of the contracts, and efficiency need not hold even...

This paper considers a two agent model of trade with multiple priors. First, we characterize the existence of an agreeable bet on some event in terms of the set of priors. It is then shown that the existence of an agreeable bet on some event is a strictly stronger condition than the existence of...

A holdup model is analyzed in which one party, the seller, has an investment project that the other party, the buyer, can subsidize. The investment project remains the seller's; she cannot transfer her entire control rights to it. In particular, she can always refuse to allow the buyer to...