[eng] Losses of Welfare and Market Power in the French Food Industry by Pascal Lavergne, Vincent Réquillart and Michel Simioni . We study the practical problems of estimating losses of welfare resulting from market power. Particular attention is paid to the specification of demand functions,...

In empirical research, one commonly aims to obtain evidence in favor of re- strictions on parameters, appearing as an economic hypothesis, a consequence of economic theory, or an econometric modeling assumption. I propose a new theoret- ical framework based on the Kullback-Leibler information to...

We study the influence of a bandwidth parameter in inference with conditional estimating equations. In that aim, we propose a new class of smooth minimum distance estimators and we develop a theory that focuses on uniformity in bandwidth. We establish a vn-asymptotic representation of our...

A procedure for testing the signicance of a subset of explanatory variables in a nonparametric regression is proposed. Our test statistic uses the kernel method. Under the null hypothesis of no effect of the variables under test, we show that our test statistic has a nhp2/2 standard normal...

A procedure for testing equality across nonparametric regressions is proposed. The procedure allows for any dimension of the explanatory variables and for any number of subsamples. We consider the case of random explanatory variables and allow the designs of the regressors and the number of...

We consider testing the significance of a subset of covariates in a nonparamet- ric regression. These covariates can be continuous and/or discrete. We propose a new kernel-based test that smoothes only over the covariates appearing under the null hypothesis, so that the curse of dimensionality...

This paper warns against the use of Marshallian welfare loss in applied analysis of market power. We show how to compute the Hicksian deadweight loss from an ordinary demand. Then, from an experiment using real data on twenty-one sectors of the French food industry, we find that the Marshallian...

We consider a principal–agent model of environmental regulation with adverse selection, where firms are regulated through contracts. We show how the model allows to recover information on structural cost parameters. We use a semiparametric method to estimate consistently such parameters...