This paper proposes several statistical tests for finite state Markov games to examine the null hypothesis that data from distinct markets can be pooled. We formulate tests of (i) the conditional choice and state transition probabilities, (ii) the steady-state distribution, and (iii) the...

This paper proposes several statistical tests for finite state Markov games to examine the null hypothesis that the data are generated from a single equilibrium. We formulate tests of (i) the conditional choice probabilities, (ii) the steady-state distribution of states and (iii) the conditional...

This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second-price auction that the company Overture operated in 2004 to sell sponsored search listings on search engines. We construct a model that embodies few prior assumptions about parameters, and we present results that indicate...

This paper considers the estimation problem in dynamic games with finite actions. We derive the equation system that characterizes the Markovian equilibria. The equilibrium equation system enables us to characterize conditions for identification. We consider a class of asymptotic least squares...

This paper considers the problem of identification and estimation in the first-price multi-unit auction. It is motivated by the auctions of bus routes held in London where bidders submit bids on combinations of routes as well as on individual routes. We show that submitting a combination bid...

This Paper studies the identification problem in infinite horizon Markovian games and proposes a generally applicable estimation method. Every period firms simultaneously select an action from a finite set. We characterize the set of Markov equilibria. Period profits are a linear function of...

This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second price auc- tion that the company Overture operated in 2004 to sell sponsored search listings on its search engine. We present results that indicate that this auction has a multi- plicity of Nash equilibria. We also show that...