In the present introductory work we propose an original analytical model of coopetitive game. We suggest possible general and feasible solutions; in particular, from a coopetitive perspective, we suggest compromise solutions - for our coopetitive game, by using Kalai-Smorodinsky method.

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...

We generalize the "No-speculative-trade" theorem for finite unawareness belief structures in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013) to the infinite case.

We prove a no-speculative-trade theorem under unawareness for the infinite case. This generalizes the result for the finite case by Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013).

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We compare unawareness with probability zero belief. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the...

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out...

We generalize the No-trade theorem for finite unawareness belief structures in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2009) to the infinite case.

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...