We analyze a principal-agent model with moral hazard in which the principal has private information about the technology, and the contract offered by her may signal this information to the agent. We characterize Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game that possess the following properties that...

This paper examines the financial crisis in 2007-9 that was more severe than previous crashes, including the dot-com crash of 2001 and the market crash of 1987 (with the exception of the Great Depression of 1929). This severity was due to excessively risky speculative bets taken by the...

I model job-search monitoring in the optimal unemployment insurance framework, in which job-search effort is the worker’s private information. In the model, monitoring provides costly information upon which the government conditions unemployment benefits. Using a simple one-period model with...

We introduce credit frictions motivated by moral hazard in a general equilibrium model of international trade with two dimensions of heterogeneity and endogenous investments. Firms' competitiveness consists of capabilities to conduct process and quality innovations at low costs, whereas...