It is an old ida in game theory that the justification of Nash equilibrium as a prediction of actual play in a game is that each player by imagining himself in the positions of his opponents will be able to figure out what these other players will play, and consequently the player himself will...

This paper presents a learning process which is a generalization of the method of fictitious play of Brown. If the learning process converges, the convergence point is a Nash equilibrium. We study 2 × 2 games. Here the process always converges. The relation between the initial prior, the weight...

The Choquet integral is an integral part of recent advances in decision theory involving non-additive measures. In this article we present two new axiomatic characterizations of this functional.

An uncertain and not just risky situation may be modeled using so-called belief functions assigning lower probabilities to events, that is, to sets of possible outcomes. In this paper we introduce an axiom of consistency by which we extend the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory to...

The paper is concerned with the implications of imperfect competition and endogenous determination of the number of firms for endogenous fluctuations in the simple overlapping generations model. If firms have market power on output markets and there is free entry, such that the number of firms...

The so-called Allais Paradox (Allais (1953)) has been interpreted as a violation of the independence axiom of Savage (1954). Considering the standard experiments performed this inference is questionable. Rather the paradoxical behavior represents evidence against the expected utility hypothesis...