The authors analyze the efficiency and market equilibrium of endogenous categorization, where insurance companies classify risks on the basis of insureds' voluntary consumption of products that are correlated with underlying loss propensities, and they show that the use of such categorization...

This paper uses recursive methods to characterize the payoff frontier of self-enforcing trade agreements between countries of asymmetric size. We show that at points on the frontier where only one country's incentive constraint binds, the efficient agreement will be a non-stationary one that...

A commonly-cited finding in the innovation literature is that a monopoly tends to innovate too little. This paper demonstrates that a monopoly may devote more resources to innovation than is socially optimal if it produces a durable good. This possibility occurs because durability creates new...

We construct a three-country, two-bloc, multi-product trade model in which tariff agreements between customs union members are binding whereas inter-bloc tariff agreements are self-enforcing. Our main objective is to explore how the liberalization of trade between customs union members (i.e. the...

We consider a simple three-country, multi-commodity trade model in which two custom union members that have successfully coordinated their external tariff policies are in the process of deepening the integration of their internal markets through the removal of tariffs on intra-union trade. Union...

This paper examines the welfare of a capital exporting or source country and a capital importing or host country under tax credit and tax deduction systems for the international taxation of capital. Because the two tax systems may create quite different strategic incentives for the countries,...