This paper examine a class of two-sided matching problems with non-transferable utility. Agents are horizontally differentiated, and each would prefer to be matched with a similar partner; in short, “like attracts like”. Although such preferences imply a unique stable matching, the degree of...

The objective of the paper is to develop and estimate a non-parametric dynamic model of the marriage market. Individuals are differentiated by their age and current marital status. In each period, unmarried men and women choose whether they want to marry and who to marry. Equilibrium transfers...

This paper examines why German men marry women from countries which are less economically developed. Two hypotheses deduced from exchange theory and the economic theory of the family are tested: 1. Low physical and social attractiveness as well as reduced opportunities to meet German partners...

In this paper, we estimate a collective model of household labour supply à la Chiappori on British two-earner couples, using data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We find that family members do not pool their resources: the unitary model is rejected. We estimate a sharing rule...

Bride price customs are widespread in many developing countries. While the economic literature has widely investigated the implications of such transfers on women's welfare, little is known about their consequences on men's premarital behavior. In this paper, we exploit a quasi-natural...

I show how an interaction between the imbalance of the sex ratio and the jump in divorce rates after a liberalization in divorce laws can obtain in a model of marriage market matching with non-transferable utility. If sex ratios are more unbalanced, the size of the jump in divorce rates...

We analyze the interaction of race with physical and socioeconomic characteristics in the U.S. marriage market, using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1999 to 2009 for black, white, and inter-racial couples. We consider the anthropometric characteristics of both spouses, together with...

This study examines the relationship between bargaining power and the use of contraceptives in the household. Using data from rural Bangladesh in 1998-1999 it investigates whether women in a relatively strong bargaining position at the time of marriage continue to remain in a strong position...

We develop a matching model on the marriage market, where individuals have preferences over the smoking status of potential mates, and over their socioeconomic quality. Spousal smoking is bad for non-smokers, but it is neutral for smokers, while individuals always prefer high socioeconomic...