The function of independent directors has been extensively documented, but the general question of how they are appointed remains insufficiently explored. We find that the likelihood of the appointment of candidates is higher when those candidates are professionally affiliated with departing...

This paper shows that long-term shareholders embed horizon incentives in executive compensation contracts as a mechanism to promote long-term oriented managerial behavior. Increases in long-term institutional ownership lead to longer equity vesting periods measured by CEO pay duration. Further,...

In this paper, I investigate the interaction between the duration of executive compensation and shareholder governance. I show that short-term compensation can elicit shareholder intervention and thus enhance firm value. The central mechanism is that the use of short-term incentives enables...

Given CEOs' substantial equity portfolios, much recent literature on CEO incentives regards cash-based bonus plans as largely irrelevant, begging the question of why nearly all CEO compensation plans include such bonuses. We develop a new measure of bonus plan incentives, and document that...

We document that firms can effectively retain executives by granting deferred equity pay. We show this by analyzing a unique regulatory change (FAS 123-R) that prompted 723 firms to suddenly eliminate stock option vesting periods. This allowed CEOs to keep 33% more options when departing the...

In response to corporate governance concerns, SEC disclosure rules, and encouragement by Institutional Shareholder Services, most large U.S. public firms have adopted executive stock ownership requirements in recent years. Compared to CEOs already in compliance, CEOs who have not yet fulfilled...

This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by developing and testing theory regarding positive and negative synergies between the CEO's and the board's human and social capital. Using a sample of 360 biotechnology firms that went public between 1995 and 2010, we demonstrate...

In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, flawed variable pay structures of executives were blamed by many for contributing to the build-up of the global financial turmoil, as they allegedly incentivized them to engage in excessive risk-taking. Legislators around the globe decided to...