We consider a duopoly with horizontally differentiated firms, where firms decide the long-term plans (locations) in addition to short-term issues (prices). As in Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2014), we introduce a third entity in the city by considering the presence of a policymaker that...

This work tests the predictions of Sutton’s model of independent submarkets for the Italian retail banking industry. In the first part of this paper, I develop a model of endogenous mergers to evidence the relationship between firms’ conduct, market entry and market structure. In the second...

This paper studies the consequence of an imprecise recall of the price by the consumers in the Bertrand price competition model for a homogeneous good. It is shown that firms can exploit this weakness and charge prices above the competitive price. This markup increases for rougher recall of the...

This paper introduces a simple extensive form pricing game.The Bertrand outcome is a Nash equilibrium outcome in this game, but it is not necessarily subgame perfect.The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome features the following comparative static properties.The more similar firms are, the...

In Russia the chain-stores gained a considerable market power. Our model combines a Dixit-Stiglitz industry with a monopolistic retailer. The questions addressed are: Does the retailer always deteriorate welfare, prices and variety of goods? Which market structure is worse: Nash or Stackelberg...

We develop a monopolistic competition model with two sectors and heterogeneousagents who self-select into entrepreneurship, depending on entrepreneurial ability. Theeffect of market size on the equilibrium share of entrepreneurs crucially hinges on propertiesof the lower-tier utility function...

This paper analyses the effect of antidumping (AD) duties on the pricing behaviour of exporters targeted with these measures. Using product and firm-level data for South Korea, the study provides evidence of increased export unit values and firms’ markups following the imposition of AD ad...

When upstream firms compete in quantity and freely enter the input market, competition among downstream firms reduces the input price (the marginal cost of downstream firms). The industry profits of downstream firms competing in quantity can increase with the number of downstream firms.

The empirical literature on mergers, market power and collusion in differentiated markets has mainly focused on methods relying on output and/or panel data. In contrast to this literature we suggest a novel approach that allows for the detection of collusive behavior among a group of firms...