The paper develops an account of anomalous behavior in work at the intersection of cognition and experimental economics. The anomalies are choices which conflict with both agents' self-interest and also with any plausible other-regarding interests. I review three examples, and provide evidence...

This responds to an invitation to comment on Steve Fuller’s severely critical appraisal of Thomas Kuhn. In a slightly different version it appears, along with other invited comments and a response from Steve Fuller, in Social Epistemology 17:211-213 (November 2003).

The prevailing account of expert vs. lay conflicts of risk intuition on such matters as nuclear waste and pesticides is that experts focus on a very narrow range of consequences, but ordinary people have a much richer sense of what is involved in choices about risk. Experts may feel comfortable...

This is the Introduction to a forthcoming book (McGraw-Hill, January 2002) on the origin of the Scientific Revolution. It includes a chapter-by-chapter outline of the book.

This is an invited comment on a forthcoming target article (Rachlin, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, in press) which provides a further entry in the long list of proposals for reducing what might be seen as social motivation to some roundabout form of self-interest. But his argument exhibits the...

This draft material gives an account of the "S-diagram", which uses Schelling's social choice diagram in the context of my NSNX ("neither selfish nor exploited") model of individual choice to provide an account of social equilibrium in situations in which social outcomes are contested. Examples...

The paper considers some aspects of rival beliefs in religion as against rival beliefs in science. This can easily account for why tolerance is far more characteristic of science, but leaves some question about the extreme zeal that has often marked religious rivalry. One essential aspect seems...

The paper sketches a neoDarwinian model of cooperation, which is then used to analyze archived data from two prominent series of public goods experiments. Each of three tests supports a conjecture drawn from the model, but also reveals a cognitive complication. Copyright Kluwer Academic...

A leading recent line of work in game theory applied to politics exploits the "pivotal voting" insight introduced by Austen-Smith and Banks [1]. The most prominent follow-on papers have been by Feddersen and Pesendorfer [2, 3, 4, 5], where a particularly striking result is that in a large...