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Modeling problems for a monetary economy are discussed and some examples are presented in the context of an infinite-horizon economy with one or two types of traders, who use fiat money to buy a single perishable consumption good. Three instances are considered, all with transactions in fiat...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249183
We consider economies with preferences drawn from a very general class of strongly convex preferences, closely related to the class of convex (but intransitive and incomplete) preferences for which Mas-Colell proved the existence of competitive equilibria [13]. We prove a strong core limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249184
We study a model in which collusive duopolists divide up the monopoly profit according to their relative bargaining power. We are particularly interested in how the negotiated profit shares depend on the sizes of the firms. If each can produce at the same constant unit cost up to its capacity,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249186
There is a considerable tension in neo-Keynesian macroeconomics as to whether the familiar IS-LM analysis should be interpreted as a description of equilibrium or disequilibrium. The present paper shows how the IS-LM model can be used for either purpose. The first section provides the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249187
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249188
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249189
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249190
A sufficient condition is given such that first-order autoregressive processes are strong mixing. The condition is specified in terms of the univariate distribution of the independent identically distributed innovation random variables. Normal, exponential, uniform, Cauchy, and many other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249191
Cooperation in repeated games relies on the possibility that equilibrium play following some t-period history depends on more than simply the structure of the game remaining after the first t periods, that structure being always the same. In a nondegenerate theory of renegotiation, what a player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249192