This paper experimentally investigates cooperative game theory from a normative perspective. Subjects designated as Decision Makers express their view on what is fair for others, by recommending a payoff allocation for three subjects (Recipients) whose substitutabilities and complementarities...

We identify a universal type space of possible interdependent (expected utility) preferences of a group of agents satisfying two criteria. First, a type consists of a "detail free" description, in a natural language, of the agents' interdependent preferences. Second, distinct types in the...

We present a model in which an outside bank and a default penalty support the value of fiat money, and experimental evidence that the theoretical predictions about the behavior of such economies, based on the Fisher-condition, work reasonably well in a laboratory setting. The import of this...

We propose a model of data provision and data pricing. A single data provider controls a large database that contains information about the match value between individual consumers and individual firms (advertisers). Advertisers seek to tailor their spending to the individual match value. The...

We provide methods for inference on a finite dimensional parameter of interest, theta in Re^{d_theta}, in a semiparametric probability model when an infinite dimensional nuisance parameter, g, is present. We depart from the semiparametric literature in that we do not require that the pair...

We discuss how leverage can be monitored for institutions, individuals, and assets. While traditionally the interest rate has been regarded as the important feature of a loan, we argue that leverage is sometimes even more important. Monitoring leverage provides information about how risk builds...

We show that if agents are risk neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses).

We develop an equilibrium lifecycle model of education, marriage and labor supply and consumption in a transferable utility context. Individuals start by choosing their investments in education anticipating returns in the marriage market and the labor market. They then match based on the...

We derive mean-unbiased estimators for the structural parameter in instrumental variables models with a single endogenous regressor where the sign of one or more first stage coefficients is known. In the case with a single instrument, the unbiased estimator is unique. For cases with multiple...