In some countries the reform of public health care provision has been accompanied by a parallel process of devolution that has also entailed the organisation of health care becoming a regional competence. However, the application of fiscal federalism in the context of the provision of health...

In a recent article Davidson, Lawrence and Wilson propose a model showing that, in the presence of distortionary taxation and goods of different quality, tax evasion can be an optimal device. Here, we show that this result, although quite interesting, cannot be generalised to a framework where...

This article examines the resource allocation process in the internal market for health care and argue that the observed allocation is the result of the maximisation procedure of different agents, whose behaviour might not be fully detected by the system and whose preferences might not even...

The market for innovative drugs is characterised by a high level of regulation, whose impact on the market is not neutral. Strict regulation may in fact adversely affect incentives to develop new and better products; on the other hand high prices may drive an unsustainable increase of healthcare...

We use 2009-14 data from patients hospital discharges to assess the effects of fiscal federalism on the quality of care provided to regional and extraregional patients in Lombardy. Empirical results suggest that even after controlling for hospital fixed effects, patients demographic and health...

This article provides a possible explanation for the heterogeneity of tax reaction functions under tax competition. In particular, we assume the existence of three jurisdictions, i, j and z, as well as of spillovers. Given this simple framework, we show that if jurisdictions compete to attract...

Although tax evasion and auditing are dynamic processes, they have been approached in a dynamic framework only recently. We argue that the decision to avoid taxes is dynamically embedded with consumption decisions, which in turn are driven by consumption habits. The model is cast in a dynamic...

We solve the problem of a representative agent who maximises the expected present utility of his intertemporal consumption under the assumption that an optimal fraction of his wealth is hidden to the tax authorities (we show conditions under which evasion is expedient). Evasion affects the...

In this study, we argue that the rules set by a central government to allocate interregional equalization grants may induce richer regions to ask for devolution, even when centralized provision is more efficient. We model a local public good with spillovers in a framework in which devolution is...