The paper uses a real option approach to investigate the potential impact of performance-based risk-sharing agreements for the reimbursement of new drugs in comparison with standard cost-effectiveness thresholds. The results show that the exact definition of the risk-sharing agreement is key in...

Patient mobility is a key issue in the EU who recently passed a new law on patients’ right to EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a Hotelling model with two regions that differ in technology to study the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care financing and...

In a model where health care provision, its regional distribution and the equalisation grant are the result of a utilitarian bargaining between a (relatively) rich region and a poor one, a First Best solution can be reached only if the two Regions have the same bargaining power. From a policy...

Patient mobility is a key issue in the EU which recently passed a new law on a patient's right to EU-wide provider choice. In this paper we use a Hotelling model with two regions that differ in technology to study the impact of patient mobility on health care quality, health care financing and...

In this model we use delay as a tool to reduce demand in a public health care system when the public resources are not sufficient to match demand. Our results show that: 1) the presence of a waiting time implies that politicians might well exploit voters’ unease in order to set rent seeking...

Internet and e-commerce have profoundly changed society, the economy, and the world of health care. The web offers opportunities to improve health, but it may also represent a big health hazard since it is a basically unregulated market with very low consumer protection. In this paper we analyze...

We use a simple version of the Psychological Expected Utility Model (Caplin and Leahy, QJE, 2001) to analyze the optimal choice of information accuracy by an individual who is concerned with anticipatory feeling. The individual faces the following trade-off: on the one hand information may lead...

This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...