We show how nonsymmetric politicization can rise in a democracy where voters are distributed across several ex-ante symmetric sectors. The voters are uncertain about the administrative ability of an elected official. they observe the quality of her performance, which depends on her ability and...

The method of fictitious transfers (or lambda-transfers) is used in cooperative game theory to extend solution concepts from the transferable utility case to the more general case of games without transferable utility. The importance of this idea is examined in the context of the history of its...

This paper is an introduction to the analysis of games with incomplete information, using a Bayesian model. the logical foundations of the Bayesian model are discussed. To describe rational behavior of players in a Bayesian game, two basic solution concerts are present: Bayesian equilibrium, for...

A general class of games with population uncertainty is formulated to describe situations where the set of players is not common knowledge. Simplifying independent-actions and environmental-equilvalence conditions imply that the numbers of players of each type are independent Poisson random...

A simple model is used to compare, under different electoral systems, the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters, by making campaign promises that favor small groups, rather than appealing equally to all voters. In this game model, each candidate...