We consider allocation rules that choose both a public outcome and transfers, based on the agents' reported valuations of the outcomes. Under a given allocation rule, a bribing situation exists when one agent could pay another to misreport his valuations, resulting in a net gain to both agents....

Quitting games are sequential games in which, at any stage, each player has the choice between continuing and quitting. The game ends as soon as at least player chooses to quit; player i then receives a payoff r, which depends on the set S of players that did choose to quit. If the game never...

Paradoxes from statistics and decision sciences form amusing, yet intriguing mathematical puzzles. On deeper examination, they constitute serious problems that could cause us, unintentionally, to adopt inferior alternatives. It is indicated here how ideas form "dynamical chaos" and orbits of...

This paper suggests definitions for two closely related terms which are (or could be) used in the social sciences. First, "rationality" is defined as a behavior which will not be altered as a result of awareness to its analysis. Next, an "ascriptive theory" is defined to be a descriptive theory...