Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into account that priorities of the participants may change during the conflict. In this paper we propose an extensive-form game model to handle such situations and suggest and study a solution concept,...

We present and axiomatize several update rules for probabilities (and preferences) where there is no unique additive prior. In the context of non-additive probabilities we define and axiomatize Bayesian update rules; in the context of multiple (additive) priors we define maximum likelihood...

This paper analyzes some decision/belief paradoxes from a Bayesian viewpoint, focusing on Hempel's "paradox of confirmation" and Good's variation of it. It is shown that a straightforward Bayesian analysis revolves the paradoxes discussed. These exampmles are used to support the view tha twhat...

Many conditions have been introduced to weaken the continuity re- quirements for equilibrium existence in games. We introduce a new con- dition, called regularity, that is simple and easy to verify. It is implied both by Reny's better-reply security and Simon and Zame's endogenous sharing rule...

This paper analyzes a model of decision under ambiguity, deemed vector expected utility or VEU. According to the proposed model, an act f, mapping states of nature to prizes, is evaluated via the sum of (1) a baseline expected-utility term, and (2) an ambiguity-adjustment term. The adjustment...

For different purposes, economists may use different topologies on types. We char- acterize the relationship among these various topologies. First, we show that for any general types, convergence in the uniform-weak topology implies convergence in both the strategic topology and the uniform...