Showing 1 - 8 of 8
In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always bene.cial to social welfare. Svensson (2005) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not at all that likely....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005101803
The benefits of inflation targeting by comparison to alternative regimesare understood to be in terms of providing clearer objectives that help pin down private sector expectations in the long run. We argue that the mechanism for achieving this rests on the fact that monetary policy can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005106670
We study optimal bidder collusion at first-price auctions when the collusive mechanism only relies on signals about bidders' valuations. We build on Fang and Morris (2006) when two bidders have low or high private valuation of a single object and additionally each receives a private noisy signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288798
We study optimal bidder collusion at first-price auctions when the collusive mechanism only relies on signals about bidders' valuations. We build on Fang and Morris (2006) when two bidders have low or high private valuation of a single object and additionally each receives a private noisy signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009532198
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376095
We study optimal bidder collusion at first-price auctions when the collusive mechanism only relies on signals about bidders’ valuations. We build on Fang and Morris (2006) when two bidders have low or high private valuation of a single object and additionally each receives a private noisy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903799
In the context of macroeconomic coordination, studies of the social value of information distinguish sharply between private and public information.  However, no information is truly public (that is, common knowledge) or private in the established sense.  This paper develops a general approach...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047915
We study optimal bidder collusion in an independent private value first-price auction with two bidders and two possible valuations. There is a benevolent center that knows the bidders’ valuations and sends private signals to the bidders in order to maximize their expected payoffs. After...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011151143