More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. It makes a difficult and large literature of the new regulatory economics accessible to the average graduate student, while offering insights into the...

In Competition in Telecommunications, Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole analyze regulatory reform and the emergence of competition in network industries using the state-of-the-art theoretical tools of industrial organization, political economy, and the economics of incentives. The book opens...

This paper draws a remarkably simple bridge between auction theory and incentive theory. It considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several fi rms. The firms have private information about their future cost at th e bidding stage, and the selected firm ex post invests in cost...

Our companion article developed a clear conceptual framework of negotiated or regulated interconnection agreements between rival operators and studied competition between interconnected networks, under the assumption of nondiscriminatory pricing. This article relaxes this assumption and allows...

We develop a framework for Internet backbone competition. In the absence of direct payments between websites and consumers, the access charge allocates communication costs between websites and consumers and affects the volume of traffic. We analyze the impact of the access charge on competitive...

This article extends the theory of network competition by allowing receivers to derive a surplus from receiving calls and to affect the volume of communications by hanging up. We investigate how receiver charges affect internalization of the call externality. When the receiver charge and the...

This article considers a two-period model of natural monopoly and second-sourcing. The incumbent supplier invests in the first period. After observing the incumbent's first-period performance, the buyer may break out in the second period. The investment may or may not be transferable to the...