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Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Glycopantis, Dionysius; Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 2004
We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293711
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Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences
Engelmann, Dirk; Grimm, Veronika - 2008
We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010299751
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Consistency, Monotonicity and Implementation of Egalitarian Shapley Values
van den Brink, René; Funaki, Yukihiko; Ju, Yuan - 2007
of solutions using monotonicity properties. Finally, we provide a non-cooperative implementation for these solutions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325573
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Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values
van den Brink, Rene; Funaki, Yukihiko - 2010
characterizes the corresponding delta-discounted Shapley value. Moreover, we provide a strategic implementation of these solutions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326064
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A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games
van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2012
In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326336
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Learning and Implementation on the Internet
Friedman, Eric; Shenker, Scott - 1998
We address the problem of learning and implementation on the Internet. When agents play repeated games in distributed … context. Finally, we discuss implementation of social choice functions with these solution concepts. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334355
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Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games
Milchtaich, Igal - 2009
In a correlated equilibrium, the players' choice of actions is affected by random, correlated messages that they receive from an outside source, or mechanism. This allows for more equilibrium outcomes than without such messages (pure-strategy equilibrium) or with statistically independent ones...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336013
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On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game
Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016
interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582516
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Supermodular mechanism design
Mathevet, Laurent A. - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 3, pp. 403-443
equilibrium. Finally, I provide a revelation principle for supermodular implementation in environments with general preferences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599433
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Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments
Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3, pp. 609-661
We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599472