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To Err is Human: Implementation in Quantal Response Equilibria

Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus - 2011

We study the classical implementation problem when players are prone to make mis- takes. To capture the idea of … Maskin Monotonicity, and no worst alternative conditions are necessary for restricted Limiting LQRE (LLQRE) implementation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009652364

Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a Three-agent Economy

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Prez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547131

Forming Efficient Networks

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547440

Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments

Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent - In: Theoretical Economics 7 (2012) 3

We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246638

On the Selection of Arbitrators

de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir; Knight, Brian - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

. We take an implementation-theoretic approach and provide theoretical, empirical and experimental analyses of this problem …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399707

Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks

Juarez, Ruben; Kumar, Rajnish - Department of Economics, University of Hawaii-Manoa - 2012

network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of implementation. The first property, Pareto Nash … Implementation (PNI), requires that the ecient outcome always be implemented in a Nash equilibrium and that the efficient outcome … rules that meet PNI. These mechanisms are also characterized under Strong Nash Implementation. The second property, Weakly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493710

Strong Nash Implementability via Critical Profiles

PASİN, Pelin - In: Iktisat Isletme ve Finans 26 (2011) 303, pp. 85-101

simple mechanism for implementation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009283263

Bertrand Delegation Games With Implementability In Weakly Undominated SPNE

Shino, Junnosuke - Department of Economics, Rutgers University-New Brunswick - 2012

In this paper we investigate a delegation game in which the underling situation is represented by a standard Bertrand price competition. In contrast to Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai ([1987], hereafter FJK), we employ a weakly undominated SPNE as the equilibrium concept based on Shino [2012] and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607670

2x2 Delegation Games With Implementability In Weakly Undominated SPNE

Shino, Junnosuke - Department of Economics, Rutgers University-New Brunswick - 2012

In this paper we study delegation environments based on Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai ([1987], hereafter FJK). By imposing a certain assumption on the notion of implementability, called implementability with mutually rational agents, they show that every efficient outcome can be fully implemented...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010607674

Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium

Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic - Department of Economics, Leicester University - 2009

profile. This definition generalizes Maskin’s definition of Nash implementation in that it does not require each optimal … Maskin’s monotonicity, is necessary for implementation. We provide sufficient conditions for implementation and show that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004961262