We analyze an environment plagued by double moral hazard where the worker's effort level and the employer's monitoring level are not contractible. In such an environment, the employer tends to over-monitor thereby inducing low effort. To ease the latter problem, the employer may choose to...

The coronavirus epidemic has instigated an economic crisis emanating from public health policies involving economic lockdown as well as behavioral reactions of workers and employers. The developed world has not seen such an extent of economic damage since at least the Second World War. We...

In many countries wages are set by collective agreements. Such agreements tend to impose wage equality among the a⁄ected workers. We use a moral-hazard environment with two inferiority-averse workers who di⁄er in their productivities but are otherwise identical. In this setting, we analyze...

In many countries, wages are set by collective agreements, which tend to impose standard wages across workers in the same sector and job. We analyze the impact of imposing such standard wages on labor market outcomes. We set the labor relationship in a moral-hazard environment where two...