We model the design of labor market institutions in an economy characterized by moral hazard and irreversible investment. In this setting the institutional design affects the bargaining power of labor. At the optimum, the allocation of bargaining power balances the aforementioned frictions. We...

Based on a general growth model, this paper finds that the steady-state direction of technological progress is determined by the scale return of the production function and the relative factor supply elasticities. A specific version of that model extends Acemoglu (2002) to provide the underlying...

What determines the direction of technological progress is one of the central questions that economics needs to answer. By introducing a small but fundamental generalization of Acemolgu (2002) the current paper points out the key determinants of that direction. The extended model argues that...

The article is concerned with understanding the impact of social preferences and wealth inequality on aggregate economic outcomes. We investigate how different manifestations of other-regarding preferences affect incentive contracts at the microeconomic level and how these in turn translate into...

The Jewish and the Arab sectors in Israel differ widely in every aspect of their respective socio-economic status. In particular, investment in education is much lower in the Arab sector and so is the educational attainment. To explain these differences, we construct a simple model which allows...