to identify the effects of prohibiting start-up acquisitions. We differentiate between killer acquisitions (when the … incumbent does not commercialize the acquired start-up's technology) and acquisitions with commercialization. A restrictive …

to identify the effects of prohibiting start-up acquisitions. We differentiate between killer acquisitions (when the … incumbent does not commercialize the acquired start-up's technology) and acquisitions with commercialization. A restrictive …

Anticompetitive mergers increase competitors' profits, since they reduce competition. Using a model of endogenous … mergers, we show that such mergers nevertheless may reduce the competitors' share-prices. Thus, event-studies can not detect … anti-competitive mergers. …

to identify the effects of prohibiting start-up acquisitions. We differentiate between killer acquisitions (when the … incumbent does not commercialize the acquired start-up's technology) and acquisitions with commercialization. A restrictive …

to identify the effects of prohibiting start-up acquisitions. We differentiate between killer acquisitions (when the … incumbent does not commercialize the acquired start-up's technology) and acquisitions with commercialization. A restrictive …

the insiders' dilemma, i.e. profitable mergers do not occur. This strategy may thus be more profitable for a buyer than …

Theoretically, cross ownership may mitigate mergers, i.e. market concentrations. Holding a share in a competing firm …

an anthitrust authority present to approve mergers, and there is sufficient alignment of interests between the antitrust …

the insiders' dilemma, i.e. profitable mergers do not occur. This strategy may thus be more profitable for a buyer than …

Theoretically, cross ownership may mitigate mergers, i.e. market concentrations. Holding a share in a competing firm …