The theory of incomplete contracts has been used to study the relationship between buyers and suppliers following the deployment of modern information technology to facilitate coordination between them. Previous research has sought to explain anecdotal evidence from some industries on the recent...

This study focuses on the relation between current compensation and past performance measures as signals of a CEO’s ability. We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection and test theoretical predictions using CEO compensation data from 1993-2006....

We examine the relation between R&D intensity and the weights on ability indicators and financial performance measures in CEO compensation. The CEO’s technology-related ability is likely more important in R&D intensive firms. Therefore, we predict that these firms place higher weights on...

We propose an analytical model that integrates two parallel independent streams of the literature, agency theory and organizational control theory. In doing so, we provide new insights into agency theory by introducing the concept of a congruent agent, and new insights into organizational...

This paper proposes a principal-agent model of moral hazard and adverse selection that introduces the notion of screening, which is distinct from sorting; and distinguishes between ability that is privately known by the agent versus general ability that is observable by the principal and market....

We investigate the relationship between security breaches and chief information officer (CIO) turnover. Because CIOs are directly responsible for IT performance, we argue that their turnover likelihood is higher when they fail to meet IT performance expectations, as reflected by security...