This paper proposes a principal-agent model of moral hazard and adverse selection that introduces the notion of screening, which is distinct from sorting; and distinguishes between ability that is privately known by the agent versus general ability that is observable by the principal and market....

This paper proposes a principal-agent model of moral hazard and adverse selection that introduces the notion of screening, which is distinct from sorting; and distinguishes between ability that is privately known by the agent versus general ability that is observable by the principal and market....

Almost 30 years after the introduction of the CIO position, the ideal CIO reporting structure (whether the CIO should report to the CEO or the CFO) is yet to be prescribed. There is an intuitive assumption among some proponents of IT that the CIO should always report to the CEO to promote the...

Earnings management research often uses discretionary accruals from Jones-type models. These models assume a linear relation between sales changes and accruals. However, we predict and find that sales changes have a non-linear asymmetric effect on accruals through managers' operating decisions....

We analyze the expected value of information about an agent's type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent's type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the...

We examine the relation between demand uncertainty and firms' production outsourcing decisions. Contrary to the traditional view on make-or-buy decisions in management accounting textbooks, we predict that demand uncertainty deters outsourcing by a manufacturer from a supplier. Building on...