In his work on signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and in which sellers, with private information about their type, choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. We follows Spence's suggestion of introducing...

This paper examines an Outside Option Game Designed to study the tension between maximizing the size of the surplus and bargaining over the division of thus surplus among those who contributed to its creation.

We study a population of agents , each of whome can be an Altruist or an Egoist. Altruism is a strictly dominated strategy. Agent choose their actions by imitating others who earn high payoffs. Interactions between agents are local, so that each agent affects (and is affected by) only his neighbors.

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Robinstein's alternative-offers, infinite- horizon bargaining game.