The standard method when analyzing the problem of cooperation using evolutionary game theory is to assume that people … illustrate how reputation based choice of opponents can explain both the emergence and deterioration of cooperation. We show that … empirical and experimental evidence of cooperation is consistent with our hypothesis that people behave so as to minimize the …

We analyze a cooperation game in an evolutionary environment. Agents make noisy observations of opponents' propensity … two agents agree to play. Pareto optimal cooperation is evolutionarily stable when reputation perfectly reflects … propensity to cooperate. With some reputation noise, there will be at least some cooperation. Individual concern for reputation …

Cooperation in social dilemmas plays a pivotal role in the formation of systems at all levels of complexity, from … stability of cooperation pose an evolutionary conundrum, since cooperation, though beneficial to others, is costly to the … of cooperation without bearing the costs of cooperating themselves. Many proximate mechanisms have been proposed to …

. This raises the important issue of just how such voluntary cooperation might be obtained. In this paper, we explore the …

The standard method when analyzing the problem of cooperation using evolutionary game theory is to assume that people … illustrate how reputation based choice of opponents can explain both the emergence and deterioration of cooperation. We show that … empirical and experimental evidence of cooperation is consistent with our hypothesis that people behave so as to minimize the …

The following paper analyzes the problem of social cooperation in the provision of a public good from an evolutionary … principle of reciprocity. It will be shown that the degree of cooperation, that is the individual contribution toward the … of the nonprofit sector may well be based on conditional cooperation. …

We analyze a cooperation game and a coordination game in an evolutionary environment. Agents make noisy observations of … takes place when two agents agree to play. Socially optimal cooperation is evolutionarily stable when reputation perfectly … reflects propensity to cooperate. With some reputation noise, there will be at least some cooperation. Individual concern for …

We analyze a cooperation game in an evolutionary environment. Agents make noisy observations of opponents’ propensity … two agents agree to play. Pareto optimal cooperation is evolutionarily stable when reputation perfectly reflects … propensity to cooperate. With some reputation noise, there will be at least some cooperation. Individual concern for reputation …

. This raises the important issue of just how such voluntary cooperation might be obtained. In this paper, we explore the …