A simple second degree price discrimination model involving nonlinear pricing of packets of a homogeneous product is shown to exhibit a welfare loss compared to the situation when nonlinear pricing is prohibited. The result holds for a Cournot oligopoly as well as monopoly. Further analysis...

A two-stage, decision-making process is modeled where members of the firm vote for a feasible set of wage rates and then choose which work process to join. It is shown that this system is characterized by allocative inefficiency, noncontinuous supply functions, and wage discrimination. These...

A two-stage model of a homogeneous good oligopoly is constructed that is composed of a first stage determining (costless) information provision to consumers and then a second stage of price setting. A perfect equilibrium is found that is characterized by les s than full information and by...

This paper considers a simple model of competition based on some buyers making price comparisons between two suppliers. The difficulties of making appropriate comparisons are made greater by exclusive dealer agreements and restrictions, and by suppliers trading under more than one name. It is...

Banks supply loans for firms to enter an industry. They choose between credit restrictions, where firms' decisions are limited by contract, and credit rationing. These are both ways to avoid firmsÕ moral hazard. An equilibrium is described in both approaches. The two equilibria are compared and...

The theory of labor-managed firms has recently been extended and developed in a number of directions. This paper is intended to introduce readers to these developments. It first reviews the well-known Illyrian model of labor-managed firms and then survey s recent contributions concerning the...