The theory of labor-managed firms has recently been extended and developed in a number of directions. This paper is intended to introduce readers to these developments. It first reviews the well-known Illyrian model of labor-managed firms and then survey s recent contributions concerning the...

This paper considers a simple model of competition based on some buyers making price comparisons between two suppliers. The difficulties of making appropriate comparisons are made greater by exclusive dealer agreements and restrictions, and by suppliers trading under more than one name. It is...

A two-stage, decision-making process is modeled where members of the firm vote for a feasible set of wage rates and then choose which work process to join. It is shown that this system is characterized by allocative inefficiency, noncontinuous supply functions, and wage discrimination. These...

A two-stage model of a homogeneous good oligopoly is constructed that is composed of a first stage determining (costless) information provision to consumers and then a second stage of price setting. A perfect equilibrium is found that is characterized by les s than full information and by...

Acquiring skill is costly and, in the presence of some degree of specificity, not totally transferable between firms. If it is impossible to sign complete contracts between a profit-maximizing firm and its workers, and/or the workers value future income less than do capitalists, labor-managed...

A simple second degree price discrimination model involving nonlinear pricing of packets of a homogeneous product is shown to exhibit a welfare loss compared to the situation when nonlinear pricing is prohibited. The result holds for a Cournot oligopoly as well as monopoly. Further analysis...