The investment boundaries defined by Grenadier (2002) for an oligopoly investment game determine equilibria in open-loop strategies. As closed-loop strategies, they are not equilibria, because any firm by investing sooner can preempt the investments of other firms and expropriate the growth...

Recent work uses option prices to derive lower bounds for the risk premia of the market portfolio and individual stocks. We test the bounds conditionally. We cannot reject that they are valid, but we do reject that they are tight. Using the market bounds as forecasts appears unreasonable in many...

We develop a dynamic principal-agent model in which conditioning future pay-for-performance on monitoring signals is a perfect substitute for contemporaneous pay-for-performance in providing incentives. Average pay-for-performance is higher when monitoring is less efficient, because the...

We study strategic disclosure timing by correlated firms in the presence of risk-averse investors. Firms delay disclosures in the hope that positively correlated firms will announce especially good news and lift their own price. Risk premia rise before disclosures, drop when disclosures occur,...

We develop a dynamic principal-agent model for financing a multistage project. The optimal contract displays the following unique features: (i) There is a pecking order between milestone bonuses and deferred compensation: when an intermediate stage succeeds, principal prefers to use deferred...

We study interactions between cryptocurrency trading venues, traders, and taxation in which the venues differ in technology (fast vs. slow). The property distinguishing this market from other markets like equities is the fact that each venue clears trades separately from one another. We show...