The VCG mechanism has some nice properties if the agents-are-substitutes property holds.For example, for combinatorial auctions the property assures that the VCG mechanism is supported by a pricing equilibrium. The existence of such a pricing equilibrium is a necessary condition for the...

Two-person noncooperative games with finitely many pure strategies and ordinal preferences over pure outcomes are considered, in which probability distributions resulting from mixed strategies are evaluated according to t-degree stochastic dominance. A t-best reply is a strategy that induces a...

In this paper it is shown how to compute stable sets, defined by Mertens (1989), inthe context of bimatrix games only using linear optimization techniques.

In this paper we apply the concept of preference conjecture equilibrium introduced in Perea (2003) to signaling games and show its relation to sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce the concept of minimum revision equilibrium and show how this can be interpreted as a refinement of...

We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running timeof the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. We also show that this result...

In this paper we analyze the performance of a recently proposed sequential auction, called the c-bisection auction, that can be used for a sale of a single indivisible object. We discuss the running time and the e±ciency in the ex-post equilibrium of the auction. We show that by changing the...

The class of bargaining solutions that are defined on the domain of finite sets of alternatives and satisfy Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Covariance (COV), is characterized. These solutions select from the set of maximizers of a nonsymmetric Nash...

Incomplete preferences over lotteries on a ¯nite set of alternatives satisfying, besides independence and continuity, a property called bad outcome aversion are considered. These preferences are characterized in terms of their speci¯c multi-expected utility representations (cf. Dubra et al.,...

In multi-unit (procurement) auctions winning multiple contracts can lead to cost advantages due to synergies. As an example one can think of procurement auctions where construction firms have returns to scale for investments in specialized equipments and workers that are required in large-scale...