This paper introduces a zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate in a financial accelerator model with nominal and real rigidities. We .rst analyze the implicationsfor aggregate dynamics of binding the zero lower bound for shocks that depress the nominalinterest rate. We include...

Conferences are an important element in the work of researchers, requiring substantial investments in fees, travel expenses and the time spent by the participants. The aim of this paper is to identify the preferences of participants with respect to conference characteristics. Based on a sample...

This paper compares two approaches that aim to explain the lagged and persistent behaviorof inflation and output after a variation in the interest rate. Two variants that produce inertiaare added to a baseline DSGE model of sticky prices: 1) a lagged inflation indexation rulealong with habit...

We provide a joint treatment of three major issues that surround testing for a unit root in practice: uncertainty as to whether or not a linear deterministic trend is present in the data, uncertainty as to whether the initial condition of the process is (asymptotically) negligible or not, and...

We show that synergies enhance bidding competition to such an extent that they are a curse rather than a blessing for the bidders; they may even induce serious bankruptcy problems.

We introduce and study a unified reasoning process which allows to represent the beliefs of both a fully rational agent and of an unaware one. This reasoning process provides natural properties to introspection and unawareness. The corresponding model for the rational or boundedly rational...

We show that delaying acceptance decisions in the Ultimatum Game drastically increases acceptance rates of low offers. While in standard treatments without delay less than 20% of low offers are accepted, these numbers increase to around 65-75% as we delay the acceptance decisions by around 10...

This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. Several papers in the literature obtain the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as the unique limit of subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies when...

We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay. Mixed consistent subgame perfect equilibria exist whenever the geometric mean of the agents'' risk coefficients, ratios of...

The present paper extends the standard model of pairwise communication among Bayesianagents to cases where the structure of the communication protocol is not commonly known.We show that, even under strict conditions on the structure of the protocols and the nature of the transmitted signals, a...