We present an experiment investigating why contributions decline in repeated public goods games. To distinguish between alternative explanations for this decrease we use a strategy method to elicit strategies in a simple two-stage public goods game. By repeating the game with new opponents...

This paper presents theory and experiments to investigate how network architecture influences route-choice behavior. We consider changes to networks that, theoretically, exhibit the Pigou- Knight-Downs and Braess Paradoxes. We show that these paradoxes are specific examples of more general...

We examine the effects of social preferences and beliefs about the social preferences of others in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are reciprocally oriented. Part of the effect can be explained by a false consensus...

We investigate the effects of pay comparison information (i.e. information about what coworkers earn) and effort comparison information (information about how co-workers perform) in experimental firms composed of one employer and two employees. Exposure to pay comparison information in isolation...

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the original members may actually gain, a phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We...