Most prominent models of economic justice (and especially those proposed by Harsanyi and Rawls) are based on the assumption that impartiality is required for making moral decisions. However, although Harsanyi and Rawls agree on that, and furthermore agree on the fact that impartiality can be...

We provide a general theorem on the aggregation of preferences under uncertainty. We study, in the Anscombe-Aumann setting a wide class of preferences that includes most known models of decision under uncertainty (and state-dependent versions of these models). We prove that aggregation is...

We provide a generalization of Harsanyi (1955)'s aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the individual and social level. Individuals and society have possibly incomplete expected utility preferences that are represented by sets of expected utility functions. Under Pareto...

The evaluation of social risk equity for alternative probability distributions over the potential sets of fatalities is analyzed axiomatically. Fishburn and Straffin [Equity considerations in public risks valuation, Operatons Research 37 (1999), 229-239] have identified a necessary and...

This paper presents an axiomatic model of decision making under uncertainty which incorporates objective but imprecise information. Information is assumed to take the form of a probability-possibility set, that is, a set $P$ of probability measures on the state space. The decision maker is told...

We study the Full Bayesian Updating rule for convex capacities. Following a route suggested by Jaffray (1992), we define some properties one may want to impose on the updating process, and identify the classes of (convex and strictly positive) capacities that satisfy these properties for the...

The most usual procedure when facing decisions in complex settings consists in consulting experts, aggregating the information they provide, and deciding on the basis of this aggregated information. We argue that such a procedure entails a substantial loss, insofar as it precludes the...

When facing situations involving uncertainty, experts might provide imprecise and conflicting opinions. Recent experiments have shown that decision makers display aversion towards both disagreement among experts and imprecision of information. We provide an axiomatic foundation for a decision...

We analyze the aggregation problem without the assumption that individuals and society have fully determined and observable preferences. More precisely, we endow individuals ans society with sets of possible von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over lotteries. We generalize the classical...

We provide a generalization of Harsanyi (1955)'s aggregation theorem to the case of incomplete preferences at the individual and social level. Individuals and society have possibly incomplete expected utility preferences that are represented by sets of expected utility functions. Under Pareto...