Is ownership concentrated because founders fear being exploited by management when ownership becomes dispersed after the IPO if minority protection is weak? Or because they value control? We find a positive relation between use of security designs that separate votes from capital and frequency...

Some studies have shown that managers concentrate large fractions of their wealth in the equity of their own firm. In this paper we use a unique dataset and investigate how Swedish owner-managers invest remaining wealth conditional on a major investment in their own firm. We find no evidence...

Some studies have provided evidence that dual class shares reduce firm market value. Other studies have shown that dual class shares are more common in countries where the proxies for private benefits of control are low. In this paper we explore whether the negative relation between firm market...

Some studies have provided evidence that hedging increases firm value. Other studies have shown that managerial incentives may influence firm hedging. In this paper we provide evidence that hedging increases firm value, however, when hedging is based upon incentives caused by managers' options,...

This paper surveys and investigates Swedish firms' use of capital budgeting techniques for Foreign Direct Investments. We document that the use of the theoretically correct net present value (NPV) method decreases with the political risk in the host country, and that the use of the Payback...

Using information from insiders' actual tax forms, filed with the Swedish tax authorities, we find evidence that firm dividend policy conforms to the insiders' tax-induced preferences. These results support the theory that some shareholders actively adjust dividend policy for their personal...

In this study we use direct estimates of the diversification of the largest shareholder in a firm to study the impact of shareholder diversification on the firm. Overall, we find that under diversified controlling shareholders value control very highly. However, there is limited evidence that...

We investigate whether the use of dual-class shares affects the financial policy of Swedish public corporations. Specifically, we distinguish between firms that are controlled by owners with poor portfolio diversification (families) and those controlled by owners with diversified portfolios...

Is ownership concentrated because founders fear being exploited by management when ownership becomes dispersed after the IPO if minority protection is weak? Or because they value control? We find a positive relation between use of security designs that separate votes from capital and frequency...

Employees in Swedish firms have the legal right to be represented on the company board. However, in a considerable share of Swedish listed firms, this option is not exercised. This paper asks why that is the case. We use a simple framework, based on rational choice by individual employees. Our...