We study a model that involves identity-dependent, asymmetric negative external effects. Willingness to pay, which can be computed only in equilibrium, will reflect, besides private valuations, also preemptive incentives stemming from the desire to minimize the negative externalities. We find...

Externalities are shown to induce delays in negotiation games with complete and perfect information where a seller randomly meets one of the potential buyers at each stage of the game. Delays arise both in the finite and the infinite horizon game. In the finite horizon game, we identify delays...

We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear when there is downstream interaction among bidders after...

We study a notion of locally robust implementation that captures the idea that the planner may know agentsʼ beliefs well, but not perfectly. Locally robust implementation is a weaker concept than ex-post implementation, but we show that no regular allocation function is locally robust...

Government-sponsored auctions for production rights (e.g., license auctions, privatizations, etc.) shape the industry structure. Are there mechanisms that induce an efficient industry structure (at least when there are no positive costs to public funds)? The answer is "no" whenever firms have...

We study a model that involves identity-dependent, asymmetric negative external effects. Willingness to pay, which can be computed only in equilibrium, will reflect, besides private valuations, also preemptive incentives stemming from the desire to minimize the negative externalities. We find...

We study efficient, Bayes--Nash incentive compatible mechanisms in a social choice setting that allows for informational and allocative externalities. We show that such mechanisms exist only if a congruence condition relating private and social rates of information substitution is satisfied. If...